Raychelle Merriam v. Todd Merriam : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Raychelle Merriam v. Todd Merriam : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kenneth M. Hisatake; Attorney for Respondent.
Brent H. Bartholomew; Waine Riches; Utah Legal Services; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Merriam v. Merriam, No. 890484 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2095
M i « n wvun i v r nrrcMLO 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
*«KFU 
"50 
DOCKET NO. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RAYCHELLE MERRIAM, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
TODD MERRIAM, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Docket No. 890484-CA 
Argument Priority 
Classification No. 7 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, JUDGE DON V. TIBBS. 
KENNETH M. HISATAKE 
1825 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: (801) 486-3541 
Attorney for Respondent 
BRENT H. BARTHOLOMEW 
Utah State Bar #4269 
WAINE RICHES 
Utah State Bar #4127 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
455 North University Avenue, 
Suite 100 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 374-6766 
Toll Free: 1-800-662-1563 
Attorneys for Appellant 
FILED 
DEC 2 9 1989 
COURT OF APPEALS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION 1 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
AND STATE STATUTES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 2 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 2 
C. TRIAL COURT'S DISPOSITION OF THE CASE 3 
D. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 5 
ARGUMENTS 6 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 6 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY AWARDING CUSTODY BASED UPON 
APPELLANT'S UNSUBSTANTIATED "EXTRAMARITAL 
AFFAIRS " 7 
A. Moral character is only one of many 
factors a trial court should consider in awarding 
child custody 7 
B. The trial court's finding that 
Respondent's moral character was superior to 
that of Appellant was not supported by 
the evidence 8 
C. The trial court improperly relied 
upon Respondent's witness invoking the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
in determining that Appellant had extramarital 
sexual intercourse 10 
D. Even if Appellant had an extramarital 
sexual relationship, there was no evidence 
showing such behavior was detrimental to 
the children 12 
E. The trial court's custody award was 
based upon the outmoded concept of fault 
and was aimed at punishing Appellant 12 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY BASING ITS 
CUSTODY AWARD UPON EVIDENCE NOT PROPERLY 
BEFORE THE COURT 13 
A. The court-ordered child custody 
evaluation was never formally received into 
evidence, nor was the child custody evaluator 
called as a witness at trial 13 
B. Even if expert testimony had been 
properly before the court, as a matter of law, 
the trial court should have awarded both 
boys to Appellant 14 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, WHEN AWARDING 
CHILD CUSTODY, BY NOT CONSIDERING THAT APPELLANT 
WAS THE PRIMARY CARETAKER OF HER TWO BOYS DURING 
THE PENDENCY OF THE ACTION 15 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SPLITTING 
CUSTODY BY NOT GIVING CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT TO THE 
BOYS ' CONTINUED, CLOSE RELATIONSHIP 16 
A. Child custody awards should keep 
children together, unless circumstances 
dictate otherwise 16 
B. The evidence clearly showed Appellant's 
sons should remain together with Appellant 17 
CONCLUSION 18 
ADDENDUM 20 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987) 6 
Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988) 12 
Davis v. Fendler. 11 
First Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Schamanek, 684 
P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984) 10 
Fontenot v. Fontenot, 714 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1986) 12 
Gerard v. Young, 432 P.2d 343 (Utah 1967) 10, 11 
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982) 8 
Marchant v. Marchant. 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987). .12 
Parvzek v. Parvzek, 7 '• .- > - 15 
Pusev v. Pusev, 728 P.2d xx - (Utah 1986) . 15, 16 
Riche v. Riche. 123 Utah Adv. Rep ;: (Utah App. 1989) 7 
Sanderson v. Tryon,7 it > 8 
Scharf v. BMG Corporation. 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985) 7 
Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986) 6 
Constitutional Provisions 
United States Constitution, amend. V 2 
Utah Constitution, art. I, § 12 2 
iii 
(Table of Authorities continued) 
Utah State Statutes and Rules 
Utah Code Ann., § 30-3-10(1) 2 
Utah Code Ann., § 78-2a-3(2) (h) 1, 2 
Rules of Utah Court of Appeals, Rule 3(a) 1, 2 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) 2, 6 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 2, 14 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 706 2, 13, 14 
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RAYCHELLE MERRIAM, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
TODD MERRIAM, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdictional authority to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 78-2a-3(2)(h); and Rule 3(a) 
of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
Appellant, Raychelle Merriam ("Raychelle"), is appealing a 
portion of the Sixth District Court's split custody award in 
which Respondent, Todd Merriam ("Todd"), was awarded permanent 
custody of the parties minor child, Drew Merriam ("Drew"). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by awarding 
custody based upon Appellant's unsubstantiated "extramarital 
affairs"? 
II. Did the trial court err by basing its custody award upon 
evidence not properly before the court? 
* 
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III. Did the trial court err, when awarding child custody, 
by not considering that Appellant was the primary caretaker of 
her two boys during the pendency of the action? 
IV. Did the trial court err in splitting custody by not 
giving considerable weight to the boys' continued, close 
relationship? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATE STATUTES 
United States Constitution, Amendment V; 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, §12; 
Utah Code Ann., §30-3-10(1); 
Utah Code Ann., §78-2a-3 (2)(h); 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rule 3(a); 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a); and 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rules 702 and 706. 
(See Addendum for text of the above citations). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This appeal challenges the split child order by the 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Sixth District Judge, after a trial on 
August 2, 1989, in Manti, Sanpete County, State of Utah. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
This matter started July 1988 as two separate divorce 
actions in the Sixth District Court, Sanpete County, State of 
Utah ("the trial court"). (R. 12, 16, 103, and 112) During an 
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August 10, 1988, hearing, the two actions were consolidated into 
one case: Civil No. 9444. (R. 24, 27, and 115) 
At this same hearing, the parties entered into a stipulation 
whereby Raychelle retained custody of the parties' minor son, 
Drew Merriam, born June 3, 1986, and Todd received reasonable 
visitation of Drew. (R. 2, 24, 27-28, 104, and 115) Raychelle 
already had permanent custody her other child from a previous 
marriage, Carson Draper. (T. 14-16; see also Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 1) The trial court approved the parties' stipulation and 
later entered a written Temporary Order incorporating the terms 
of that stipulation. (R. 25-28, 166) 
On October 27, 1989, the trial court entered an Order 
appointing the Division of Family Services, Utah State Department 
of Social Services, to conduct a child custody evaluation. (R. 
37-38) After the "Child Custody Evaluation" was submitted to the 
trial court, a trial was set for and held on August 2, 1989, 
where the trial court split custody of Drew and Carson. (T. 1, 
102-103) 
Raychelle, timely and properly, filed an appeal with this 
Court contesting the trial court's split custody award of her two 
sons. (R. 78, 89, and 98; T. 1) 
C. TRIAL COURT'S DISPOSITION OF THE CASE. 
At the Merriam trial, the court ordered permanent custody of 
Carson to remain with Raychelle and awarded Todd permanent 
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custody of Drew; (T. 102-103) Furthermore, each party was 
granted reasonable visitation rights of the minor child not in 
his or her custody, to be exercised so the boys would remain 
together during visits, (T. 103, 106-107) 
D. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. 
The parties were married November 22, 1985. (T. 14-15) 
Drew, born June 3, 1986, was the parties' only child from their 
marriage. (T. 14-15) Raychelle's only other child, Carson, born 
December 18, 1983, (of whom she already had permanent custody) 
was from a previous marriage. (T. 14-16; see also Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 1) 
When the parties separated during the first part of April 
1988, Carson and Drew continued to reside with Raychelle. (T. 
15) Later, because of a stipulation entered into by the parties, 
the trial court awarded Raychelle temporary custody of Drew. (T. 
17) 
At trial Raychelle testified that she had not had 
extramarital sexual intercourse. (T. 29) Moreover, Raychelle 
testified that she had never even dated anyone, besides Todd, 
while the two were still living together. (T. 29) 
During cross examination, Todd testified that the only 
behavior he had seen Raychelle engaged in with another man was 
talking to him. (T. 65-70) 
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Except for visitation, Carson and Drew lived with Raychelle 
from the time the parties separated. Prior to the separation, 
Todd took care of the children for a short time while Raychelle 
worked, but Raychelle otherwise had the primary responsibility of 
taking care of both boys from the time of their birth. (T. 16-
18) Raychelle's care of her boys included: changing diapers, 
giving baths, helping to dress them, shopping for food, preparing 
meals, feeding her boys, reading stories, playing with her boys, 
and taking care of her boys when they were sick. (T. 18-19) 
Carson and Drew had a good relationship and were friends. 
(T. 20, 27, and 36) They were together continuously from Drew's 
birth until August 2, 1989, when Todd was awarded permanent 
custody of Drew and Raychelle retained permanent custody of 
Carson. (T. 1, 102-103) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In making its split custody decision, the trial court relied 
heavily on its erroneous finding that Raychelle had "extramarital 
affairs". The Court's findings were based upon inferences it 
drew when one witness "took the Fifth Amendment." There was 
nothing presented at trial to properly support such a finding. 
Further, even if the finding could be supported there was 
absolutely no showing whatsoever of any harm to the children. 
The trial court also erred in splitting custody by relying 
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on a "Child Custody Evaluation" and expert testimony never 
formally admitted into evidence. 
Despite clear evidence showing that Raychelle was the 
primairy caretaker of her two boys during the pendency of the 
action, the trial court improperly ignored this important factor 
in awarding child custody. 
Finally, by not considering the strong bonding between 
Carson and Drew, the trial court erroneously split custody of 
Drew and Carson. Furthermore, nothing was presented at trial to 
dictate a split custody award. 
ARGUMENTS 
Standard of Review 
This Court has delineated a review standard for findings of 
fact in appeals of permanent child custody awards: 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) states that findings of fact 
"shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." 
We are bound to follow that rule together with the 
guidance of the Utah Supreme Court in the recent case 
of Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987), in 
which the Court reviewed the case law concerning 
findings of fact. There the Court stated: "Failure of 
the trial court to make findings on all material issues 
is reversible error unless the facts in the record are 
'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only 
a finding in favor of the judgment,'" and the findings 
"'should be sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached'" 
(citations omitted). Particularly important is the 
Court's citation of Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 
(Utah 1986), a child custody matter, in which it 
declared "[p]roper findings of fact ensure that the 
ultimate custody award follows logically from, and is 
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supported by, the evidence and the controlling legal 
principles. •• We understand this to mean that a custody 
award must be firmly anchored on findings of fact that 
(1) are sufficiently detailed, (2) include enough facts 
to disclose the process through which the ultimate 
conclusion is reached, (3) indicate the process is 
logical and properly supported, and (4) are not clearly 
erroneous. [See also citations are omitted.] If this 
is not accomplished by the trial court, the issue of 
custody must be reversed unless the record itself 
supports the award to the standard reiterated in Acton. 
Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 202-203 (Utah App. 1987) 
(Emphasis added.) 
To successfully contest trial court findings, evidence in 
support of the findings must first be marshalled. Then, a 
demonstration must be made that the trial court's findings of 
fact are clearly erroneous because they run against the clear 
weight of the evidence. See Riche v. Riche, 123 Utah Adv. Rep 31, 
32 (Utah App. 1989). On the other hand, "conclusions of law [are 
given] no particular deference, but [are reviewed] for 
correctness." Scharf v. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 
(Utah 1985). 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING CUSTODY 
BASED UPON APPELLANT'S UNSUBSTANTIATED "EXTRAMARITAL AFFAIRS" 
A. Moral character is only one of many factors a trial 
court should consider in awarding child custody. 
Although a trial court should examine each party's 
demonstrated moral standards in making its custody award, moral 
character is only one of many factors the court should properly 
consider in determining a child's best interests. Utah Code Ann. 
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S 30-3-10(1); Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1987); 
see also Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982). 
B. The trial court's finding that Respondent's moral 
character was superior to that of Appellant was not supported by 
the evidence. 
The trial court found that Todd's demonstrated morals were 
better than Raychelle's. (T. 105) It went a step further in 
explaining: "[T]his marriage was disrupted because of the 
conduct of [Raychelle] and her affairs with men outside of 
marriage. . . ." (T. 102) In fact, the trial court accused 
Raychelle of not being honest regarding "her conduct with men 
outside of marriage," because of "the circumstances of her 
conduct with men outside the marriage." (T. 106) 
Todd expressed his opinion that it was Raychelle's 
"stepping out" that initiated their marital problems and 
eventually led them to seek divorces from each other. (See T. 58-
60) Todd asserted that Raychelle admitted "having sexual 
intercourse with other men." (T. 59) Todd identified one partner 
as Russell Meacham, who later testified at the trial. (See T. 59, 
80-84) The other man was said to be John "Macey" from Payson, 
although Todd was unsure of Mr. Macey's last name. (T. 59) 
When asked on cross examination: "Did you actually ever see 
[Raychelle] with other men, or did you actually see them doing 
anything inappropriately with her?" Todd admitted that he had 
only seen Raychelle talking with Mr. Meacham. (T. 69-70) 
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When Todd's attorney asked Mr. Meacham whether he had had any 
sexual intercourse with Raychelle, Mr. Meacham replied: "I'll 
plead the Fifth [Amendment] on that one." (T. 80-81) 
Further questioning of Mr. Meacham by Todd's attorney 
revealed that Mr. Meacham had first met Raychelle at one of his 
delivery stops: Charley's Drive-in ("Charley's"), in Manti, 
where Raychelle was working at the time. (T. 81, 82) On cross 
examination, Mr. Meacham explained that he stopped at Charley's 
once a week to make a delivery and to eat dinner. (T. 83) While 
at Charley's, Mr. Meacham talked to Raychelle, something he would 
do with hired help at other drive-ins, because it was part of his 
job. (T. 83) 
Other than at Charley's, Mr. Meacham had said "hello" to 
Raychelle a couple of times on the street in Sanpete County, 
something Mr. Meacham had also done with Todd. (T. 82) 
Once, Mr. Meacham did see and visit with Raychelle, outside 
of Sanpete County, in Richfield. (T. 81-82) Mr. Meacham, 
however, did not know why Raychelle was in Richfield, nor did 
Raychelle stay with Mr. Meacham. (T. 81-82) Todd also called 
Heidi Johnson ("Mrs. Johnson")—a personal friend of Todd's and a 
co-worker with Raychelle at Charley's—as a witness to try 
establishing that Raychelle had an extramarital affair. (See T. 
93-94, 96) On cross-examination, however, Mrs. Johnson admitted 
9 
that the only type of behavior in which she had ever seen Mr. 
Meacham and Raychelle engage was conversation. (T. 96) 
During direct examination Raychelle testified that she had 
never "had sexual intercourse with anyone, besides Todd, while 
[she had] been married to him." (T. 29) In fact, Raychelle even 
denied ever having "dated anyone while [she] and Todd were still 
living together." (T. 29) 
On the other hand, Raychelle introduced testimony that 
before Todd and Raychelle had separated, Todd had "stepped out" 
on Raychelle. (T. 50-51; see also T. 30-32) 
C. The trial court improperly relied upon Respondent's 
witness invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination in determining that Appellant had extramarital 
sexual intercourse. 
During closing arguments, Todd's counsel cited Gerard v. 
Young, 432 P.2d 343 (Utah 1967), to support his contention that 
Raychelle had sexual intercourse with Mr. Meacham. Gerard was a 
"[c]ivil action for termination of a cafe lease" in which 
gambling was the only issue: 
Defendant denied the allegation,—not under oath. 
Thereafter in a deposition, under oath, he took the 
Fifth Amendment, admitting that the alleged gambling 
might incriminate him, which was inconsistent with the 
denial in his pleadings. This left the sworn 
affidavits pointing to gambling, which affidavits 
further he refused to deny categorically. 
432 P. 2d 343 (Utah 1967). 
Gerard was clarified in First Federal Savings and Loan 
Association v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257, 1268 (Utah 1984): 
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Gerard v. Young, 20 Utah 2d 30, 432 P.2d 343 (1967), 
stands for the narrow proposition that where, on a 
motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff establishes 
through independent, uncontroverted evidence that he is 
entitled to summary judgment, a defendant cannot avoid 
a summary judgment by claiming the privilege against 
self-incrimination. 
First Federal Savings and Loan Association also reveals: 
To sustain an assertion of the privilege against 
self-incrimination, a party must show that the 
responses sought to be compelled might be 
incriminating. This requires more than merely 
declaring that an answer will incriminate—it requires, 
"at a minimum, a good faith effort to provide the trial 
judge with sufficient information from which he can 
make an intelligent evaluation of the claim." Davis v. 
Fendler, supra, 650 F.2d at 1160. "The claimant is not 
the final arbiter of the validity of his assertion." 
Id. 
684 P.2d 1257, 1266-1267 (Utah 1984). 
Neither Gerard, nor First Federal Savings and Loan 
Association. are applicable to the case on appeal because no 
uncontroverted evidence, independent from Mr. Meacham invoking 
his Fifth Amendment privilege was produced linking Raychelle to 
having sexual intercourse with Mr. Meacham. Furthermore, no good 
faith effort was made to provide the trial court with sufficient 
information from which it could make an intelligent evaluation of 
the claim that Mr. Meacham's testimony would be self-
incriminating. (See T. 80-82) 
By relying on Mr. Meacham invoking his Fifth Amendment 
privilege, without any independent, uncontroverted evidence to 
support the claim asserted, the trial court flagrantly abused its 
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discretion by finding Raychelle's interaction with Mr. Meacham 
was immoral. In essence, the trial court made its finding 
without any supporting evidence. Rather, the trial court relied 
on Todd's testimony that Raychelle was having an affair even 
though Todd admitted that the only thing he had ever seen was 
Raychelle talking to one other man. 
D. Even if Appellant had an extramarital sexual 
relationship, there was no evidence showing such behavior was 
detrimental to the children. 
Even if Raychelle had engaged in an extramarital sexual 
relationship, a "custodial parent's extramarital sexual 
relationship alone is insufficient to justify a change in 
custody." Fontenot v. Fontenot, 714 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1986). 
There must be a showing that the children have been "directly 
exposed to or affected" by the sexual behavior. Id. at 1132. 
No evidence or testimony showing any harm to the children 
whatsoever was admitted at trial. 
E. The trial court's custody award was based upon the 
outmoded concept of fault and was aimed at punishing Appellant. 
By awarding Todd a divorce from Raychelle because of her 
unsubstantiated extramarital relationships, the trial court 
punished Raychelle as it did the wife in Marchant v. Marchant, 
743 P.2d 199, 203 (Utah App. 1987); see also Davis v. Davis, 749 
P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988). 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY BASING ITS CUSTODY AWARD UPON 
EVIDENCE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT 
A. The court-ordered child custody evaluation was never 
formally received into evidence, nor was the child custody 
evaluator called as a witness at trial. 
On October 27, 1989, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 706, the trial court ordered the Division of Family 
Services, Utah State Department of Social Services, to conduct a 
child custody evaluation. (See R. 37-38) On or about June 12, 
1989, Mr. Bagley (a licensed social worker assigned by the Utah 
State Department of Social Services to conduct the Merriam child 
custody evaluation) submitted a report, entitled "Child Custody 
Evaluation," to the trial court and each party's attorney. Mr. 
Bagley's "Child Custody Evaluation" was never formally offered, 
nor received, into evidence. (T. 1 and 15-16; Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 1) Furthermore, at trial Mr. Bagley was not called as a 
witness. (T. 2-3) 
The trial court specifically relied on information from the 
child custody evaluator as evidence in making its findings. See 
104) 
Rule 706 (a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows courts to 
appoint experts and mandates that court-appointed experts: 
. . .shall advise the parties of his findings, if any; 
his deposition may be taken by any party; and he may be 
called to testify by the court or any party. He shall 
be subject to cross-examination by each party, 
including a party calling him as a witness. 
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 permits an expert witness 
to testify at trial providing that "expert witness" is "qualified 
as an expert" and the expert's "scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. . . . " 
Once a court-appointed witness is called as a witness and 
qualified as an expert, that expert "may testify. . .in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise," Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702; 
and "shall be subject to cross-examination by each party. . . . " 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 706. 
The Court improperly relied upon the Child Custody 
Evaluation where it was never submitted or accepted into evidence 
and where Mr. Bagley was never called as a witness, qualified as 
an expert, nor subject to cross examination at trial. 
B. Even if expert testimony had been properly before the 
court, as a matter of law, the trial court should have awarded 
both boys to Appellant. 
Even if Mr. Bagley's report was properly relied upon, Mr. 
Bagley's recommendation—and the trial court's subsequent award 
of split custody—were grossly wrong because, as stated in his 
report, Mr. Bagley's recommendation was made for reasons "more 
judgmental than pure fact " (P. 7) Mr. Bagley admitted: 
"there is very little to base an objective judgment on in this 
case." (P. 6) Moreover, Mr. Bagley found that Raychelle, the 
custodial parent of both Drew and Carson, had provided her boys 
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with a "stable home life" and had "demonstrated adequate parent-
child skills" (P. 6) 
This Court has stated: 
Where the call is a close one, we believe the child's 
interests will be best promoted by maintaining the 
prior, stable and healthy arrangement. That is, where 
the evidence was otherwise inconclusive. . .the 
paramount consideration of stability conclusively tips 
the scale in [the custodial parent's] favor and 
warrants awarding custody to [that parent], as a matter 
of law. 
Paryzek v. Parvzek, 776 P.2d 78, 83-84 (Utah App. 1989). 
As a matter of law, the trial court should have awarded 
permanent custody of both Carson and Drew to Raychelle. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, WHEN AWARDING CHILD CUSTODY, BY NOT 
CONSIDERING THAT APPELLANT WAS THE PRIMARY CARETAKER OF HER TWO 
BOYS DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE DIVORCE 
In Pusev v. Pusev, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that a court should consider the identity of 
the parent with whom the child has spent most of his or her time 
pending custody determination if the period is lengthy. 
Raychelle had custody of her child from the time of separation in 
April, 1988, until August, 1989, a period of sixteen months. 
This period is lengthy. Considering that Drew was only three at 
the time, sixteen months was almost one-half of the child's life. 
Yet no consideration whatsoever was given to Raychelle having 
Drew during this time period nor the stability developed. 
At trial the court found that "neither party is the primary 
caretaker, that they both care for the children to the best of 
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their ability when they've been in their care." (T. 104) In 
making this determination, the trial court confused "primary 
caretaker" with ability to care for the child. Raychelle was the 
primary caretaker during the lengthy pendency of the action and 
the Court should have carefully considered the stability created 
under that arrangement. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SPLITTING CUSTODY BY NOT GIVING 
CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT TO THE BOYS' CONTINUED, CLOSE RELATIONSHIP 
A. Child custody awards should keep children together, 
unless circumstances dictate otherwise. 
In Pusev v. Pusev, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court also recognized that child custody awards which 
keep children together are preferable, except when circumstances 
dictate otherwise. 
The trial court did recognize that splitting custody of Drew 
and Carson was a serious remedy, but stated that under the terms 
and under the evidence heard during the trial, it made its 
decision on what was in the best in the best interest of Drew. 
(T. 103) The trial court, however, never specifically explained 
why split custody would be in Drew's best interest. 
Consequently, it is necessary to examine the evidence presented 
at trial. 
B. The evidence clearly showed Appellant's sons should 
remain together with Appellant. 
When examined by the trial court as to whether split custody 
would have an impact on Carson and Drew, Todd stated: 
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I don't think it's gonna tear them up at all. They've 
been separated for the last year, almost every weekend 
that I've had them. They're close, but they're going 
to be better off with me than they are [Raychelle]." 
(T. 78-79) 
Todd, quite clearly, did recognize that Carson and Drew have 
a close relationship, but the rest of Todd's response to the 
trial court's inquiry is confusing. Todd expressed his opinion 
that splitting custody would not have an adverse effect on Carson 
and Drew, because "[t]hey've been separated for the last year, 
almost every weekend that I've had them. (T. 79) At a later 
point in the trial, however, Todd's mother, Joy Merriam, 
confirmed that Carson and Drew were together during Todd's 
weekend visitation. (T. 84, 86, and 88) 
On direct examination, Raychelle testified that Carson and 
Drew got along together well and were friends. She also stated 
that splitting up Carson and Drew "would tear them both apart." 
(T. 27) Until August 2, 1989, when the trial court split custody 
of Carson and Drew, these two boys had, for the most part, never 
been separated since Drew's birth over three years ago. (T. 14-
17) 
The trial court erred in making its custody award because 
their was no evidence to dictate splitting custody of Carson and 
Drew. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, this Court should vacate 
the Sixth District Court's permanent custody award of Drew 
Merriam to Respondent, Todd Merriam, and should enter an order 
granting Appellant, Raychelle Merriam, permanent custody of both 
her sons, Carson Draper and Drew Miriam. 
Respectfully submitted this 2 7 day of December, 1989. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
By Brent H. Bartholomew 
Waine Riches 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
Raychelle Merriam 
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I certify that on December 27, 1989, I mailed the following 
by first class jnail through the United States Postal Service: 
true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's 
Brief, to: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
c/o 
Janice Ray 
Deputy Clerk 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102; and 
Four true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's 
Brief, to: 
Mr. Kenneth M. Hisatake 
Attorney for Respondent 
1825 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105. 
Dated this 2 7 day of December, 1989. 
BRENT H. BARTHOLOMEW 
Attorney for Appellant, 
Raychelle Merriam 
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ADDENDUM 
United States Constitution, amend V 
Utah Constitution, art. I, § 12 
Utah Code Ann., § 30-10(1) 
Utah Code Ann., § 78-2a-3(2)(h) 
Rules of Utah Court of Appeals, Rule 3(a) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 706 
20 
AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — 
Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising J 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb: nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his 
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been com-
mitted, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to se-
cure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her hus-
band, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
1896 
Art. I, 
30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separa-
tion or divorce — Custody consider-
ation. 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children 
are separated, or their marriage is declared void or 
dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future 
care and custody of the minor children as it considers 
appropriate. In determining custody, the court shall 
consider the best interests of the child and the past 
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of 
the parties. The court may inquire of the children and 
take into consideration the children's desires regard-
ing the future custody, but the expressed desires are 
not controlling and the court may determine the chil-
dren's custody otherwise. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, 
among other factors the court finds relevant, which 
parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the 
child, including allowing the child frequent and con-
tinuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the 
court finds appropriate. 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of 
adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a cir-
cuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court o( 
record in criminal cases, except those involving* 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(0 appeals from district court in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for &' 
traordinary writs involving a criminal con^f 
tion, except those involving a first degree or capi-
tal felony; 
(h) appeals from district court m\ul\m<: do-
mestic relations cases, including but not limited 
to divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and pater-
nity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only 
'and by the vote of four judges of the court, may certify 
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review 
and determination any matter over which the Court 
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the re-
quirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 1988 
RULES OF THE UTAH COURT OF 
APPEALS 
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS 
AND ORDERS. 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: How taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judg-
ments. As defined and provided by law, an appeal 
may be taken from the final orders and judgments of 
a district court, juvenile court, or circuit court to the 
Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal with the 
clerk of the particular court from which the appeal is 
taken within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of 
an appellant to take any step other than the timely 
filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity 
of the appeal, but is a ground only for such action as 
the Court of Appeals deems appropriate, which may 
include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions 
short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney 
fees. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts with-
out a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately its con-
clusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be en-
tered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set 
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for find-
ings are not necessary for purposes of review. Find-
ings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly errone-
ous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the wit-
nesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that 
the court adopts them, shall be considered as the find-
ings of the court. It will be sufficient if the tindings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and re-
corded in open court following the close of the evi-
dence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of de-
cision filed by the court. The trial court need not en-
ter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings 
on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement 
of the ground for its decision on all motions granted 
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the 
motion is based on more than one ground. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 702. Testimony by experts. 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education, may testify thereto in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Rule 706 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule:706. Court-appointed experts. 
-, (a)^  Appointment The court may on its own mo-
tion or on the motion of any party enter an order to 
show cause why expert witnesses should not be ap-
pointed, and may request the parties to submit nomi-
nations. The court may appoint any expert witnesses 
agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert 
witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness 
shall not be appointed by the court unless he consents 
to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed of his 
duties by the court in writing, a copy of which shall 
be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which the 
parties shall have opportunity to participate. A wit-
ness so appointed shall advise the parties of his find-
ings, if any; his deposition may be taken by any 
party; and he may be called to testify by the court or 
any party. He shall be subject to cross-examination 
by each party, including a party calling him as a wit-
ness. 
(b) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed 
are entitled to reasonable compensation in whatever 
sum the court may allow. The compensation thus 
fixed is payable from funds which may be provided by 
law in criminal cases and civil actions and proceed-
ings involving just compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment. In other civil actions and proceedings 
the compensation shall be paid by the parties in such 
proportion and at such time as the court directs, and 
thereafter charged in like manner as other costs. 
(c) Disclosure of appointment. In the exercise of 
its discretion, the court may authorize disclosure to 
the jury of the fact that the court appointed the ex-
pert witness. 
(d) Part ies ' experts of own selection. Nothing in 
this rule limits the parties in calling expert witnesses 
of their own selection. 
